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RESOLVING TRADE DISPLUTES:
THE MECHANISMS OF GATT/WTO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
Daniel H. Erskine*
“For where there is an authority, a power on earth from which
relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is
excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power.”1 The resident
earthly power resolving controversies between the many sovereign nations
preventing the outbreak of war over trade related issues is the World Trade
Organization's Dispute Settlement Body. Such a Body grew from decades
of experience, and frustration, about the method of settling international
conflicts between states about tariff and trade problems.
This work discusses the historical development of the World Trade
Organization's dispute resolution system. The first part analyzes a variety
of agreements, understandings, and proposals entered into and put forward
during the period of 1947 to 1990. The second part addresses the
instrument inaugurating the World Trade Organization's current dispute
settlement procedure, and describes a number of submissions by nations
for improvements to this dispute resolution mechanism.2 The final section
concludes the work by providing a few theoretical considerations.

*

[ ] of Commercial Plant Relocators, Inc. (www.cprglobal.com) an international
relocation and construction service company. J.D. Suffolk University Law School , B.A.
Boston College .
1
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True
Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, in Political Writings of John Locke 271
(David Wootton ed., 1993).
2
See generally The Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting , TN/DS/M/1 (June 12, 2002); The
Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/2 (July 3, 2002); The Secretariat, Minutes of
Meeting , TN/DS/M/3 (Sept. 9, 2002); The Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/4
(Nov. 6, 2002).
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I. HISTORY
The initial agreement instituting the protocols known as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade foresaw the resolution of
disputes by “sympathetic consideration” through the informal means of
consultation between conflicting contracting parties.3 GATT looked to
traditional diplomatic methods of conciliation, negotiation, mediation, and
good offices between states to resolve trade conflicts. Though, serious
offenses involving nullification or impairment of a benefit accruing under
the agreement could be referred to the collective body of the contracting
parties for resolution.4 The collective then investigated the matter and
rendered suggestions or a ruling on the issue.5 If the infringement upon
the rights of one party by another is serious, then the collective can
recommend the injured party suspend concessions and other GATT
obligations made to the injuring party.6 Yet, if such action were taken, the
injuring party could give notice within sixty days of its desire to withdraw
from GATT.7
The system reflected a traditional approach to international legal
relations. Nations were sovereign, and as such retrained the freedom from
imposition of binding collective judgment rendered by an international
institution. Such an institution was inferior to the nation-state, and
therefore could not enforce its decree without consent of the sovereign

3

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXII, XXIII:1, 61 Stat. A11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. See also GATT art. VI:7, XII:4,
XVI:1, XIX:2, XXVIII (bilateral or multilateral consultations for resolution of restrictive
trade measures); GATT art. XII:4, XIX:3, XXIV:7, XXIV:10, XXV:5, XXVIII:4
(multilateral dispute resolution); GATT Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Dispute
Settlement GATT Dispute Settlement System Note , MTN.GNG/NG13/W/4 (June 5,
1987).
4
GATT art. XXIII:2.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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state. Ultimately, this position proved unworkable in the volatile and
important realm of trade relations.8
A. 1948 Havana Charter
Noteworthy is the detailed dispute procedures set forth in the
Havana Charter of 1948. The Charter reflected the first effort to produce a
sophisticated International Trade Organization governing trading relations
between member states. Looking to Chapter VIII of the Charter, members
whose benefits are impaired or nullified may submit written proposals for
amicable resolution of the injury.9 This is the consultation option.
Another choice available to disputants is reference to arbitration
under terms agreed upon by the members.10 The determination of the
arbitrator binds the parties, but not other members.11 In the event these
measures fail, any member may refer the matter to the Executive Board,
which must promptly consider whether a treaty violation occurred.12 The
board may take delimited action if a violation is found.13 If a serious
infraction is discovered, the Board “release[s] the Member or Members
affected from obligations or the grant of concessions to any other Member
or Members…to the extent and upon such conditions as it considers
appropriate and compensatory, having regard to the benefit which has
been nullified or impaired.”14 Any such decision by the Executive Board
8

See Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern
GATT Legal System 417-585 (Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993), for a history of
disputes and their resolutions. See WTO, 2 Guide to GATT Law and Practice: Analytical
Index 611-629, 630-787, art. XXII-XXXVIII , (1995) for interpretative history of GATT
Articles involved in dispute settlement.
9
Havana Charter for International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, ch. VIII, art. 93(1)
[Hereinafter Havana Charter].
10
Id. at art. 93(2).
11
Id.
12
Id. at art. 94.
13
Id. at art. 94(2)(a)-(e).
14
Id. at art. 94(3).
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can be appealed to the Conference for confirmation, modification, or
reversal.15 Finally, the opinion of the Conference can be referred to the
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.16 Such an opinion
binds the Organization, and modification of an Organization opinion
results if the Court's ruling negates that of the Organization.17
The procedures described above were not effective, due to the
Charter's failed ratification by the requisite number of signatories. Yet,
GATT dispute resolution evolved under the protocols into the
implementation of working parties to handle disputes between contracting
parties as the main form of resolving conflict.18 These working parties
became panels in 1952.19

Panels were composed of three to five

independent experts from non-disputant parties.20
B. 1966 Decision
The Contracting Parties codified procedures for disputes between
developed and developing countries in 1966.21 If a developing contracting
party and a developed contracting party could not settle their dispute by
consultation, the developing country could request the Director-General of
GATT to act ex officio by good offices to achieve a solution.22 If the
Director-General fails within two months to effect a solution, either of the
disputing parties can refer the matter to the Contracting Parties or the
Council. Either of these bodies then appoints a panel of experts with the
15

Havana Charter art. 95(1).
Id. at art. 96(2).
17
Id. at art. 96(5).
18
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Introduction to International Trade Law and the
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 1948-1996: An Introduction, 34-35 (ed. ErnstUlrich Petersmann, 1997).
19
Id. at 35.
20
Id.
21
Decision on Procedures under Article XVIII, B.I.S.D. 14S/18 (Apr. 5, 1966)
[hereinafter Decision on Procedures].
22
Id.
16
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consent of the disputants to recommend an appropriate solution.23 The
panel must submit to the Contracting Parties or the Council its
recommendation within sixty days after appointment, and those bodies
will then issue a decision upon the recommendation.24 Ninety days after a
decision is transmitted to the disputants, the party found in breach must
report on its compliance with the decision.25 If the breaching party is not
in compliance, the Contracting Parties or the Council may, upon serious
circumstances, authorize the injured party to suspend any concession or
obligation.26
C. 1979 Understanding
The 1966 Decision was followed in 1979 by a broader
Understanding articulating procedures for dispute resolution between all
contracting parties.27 In an Annex to the Understanding, customary GATT
dispute practice was affirmed and described. Panels review the facts of a
case, the applicability of GATT protocols to the dispute, and arrive at an
objective assessment of the matter.28 Panels consult directly with the
disputants, and allow for mutual solution of the dispute between the
parties.29 Failure of a panel to reach a “mutually satisfactory settlement”
usually resulted in referral of the dispute to the Contracting Parties, who in
turn avail themselves of panels to assist and recommend a ruling under
GATT Art. XXIII:2.30
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and
Surveillance, GATT Doc. L/4907, LT/TR/U/1, (Nov. 28, 1979) [hereinafter GATT
Understanding] (reaffirming the 1966 procedures as well).
28
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement, and
Surveillance, GATT Doc. L/4907, LT/TR/U/1, Annex para. 3 (Nov. 28, 1979)
[hereinafter GATT Understanding Annex].
29
Id.
30
Id.
24
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1. Customary GATT Dispute Practices
Working parties, instituted by the Council at the request of a
contracting party, establish their own working procedures.31

Such

working parties meet at least twice to consider the matter, and once to
discuss conclusions.32

The membership of the party is open to any

contracting party interested in the dispute, with disputants always
members of the working party.33 A final report, reached by consensus, is
reported to the Council as an advisory opinion that the Council adopts.
Panels, since 1952, are appointed by the contracting parties to
resolve a dispute under GATT Art. XXVIII:2.34 Disputants propose terms
of reference to the Council, which are discussed and approved by the
Council. Members of the panel are normally selected from permanent
GATT delegations or national administrators involved with GATT
activities on a regular basis.35 Additionally, members of the panel include
delegates from developing countries when the dispute involves a
developed contracting party and a developing party.36

These panel

members act impartially and independently from their national
governments. Some panels include non-governmental experts. The GATT
secretariat receives proposed nominees to the panel by the concerned
parties, which in turn confirms or denies nominees thereby forming a three
to five member panel with the consent of the concerned parties.37 The
panels then act autonomously by setting their own procedures and
schedule. Additionally, the disputants present either oral or written

31

Id. at para. 6(i).
Id.
33
Id.
34
GATT Understanding Annex para. (6)(ii).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at para. (6)(iii).
32
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communications to the panel, and answer questions posed by the panel.38
Other interested parties may also be heard, and the panel may consult
outside experts and the secretariat on historical and procedural issues.39
If no resolution is achieved, a panel sets out its findings of fact, a
determination of the applicability of GATT provision, and its rationale for
any recommendations or findings.40 Usually, this report is first given to
the parties before it is given to the Contracting Parties.41 The scope of
these reports runs from determination of whether an infringement of
GATT protocols occurred to technical opinions, but most include
recommendations to the parties. The report is anonymous and the
deliberations of the panel secret.42 The process takes about three to nine
months.43
2. New GATT Procedures for Dispute Settlement
Reaffirming GATT's commitment to the expeditious resolution of
conflicts through consultation, the Contracting Parties laid down
procedures to solve disputes failing to resolve themselves through
consultation. Underlying the dispute resolution system are the principles
of conducting the process in good faith and proceedings not being
contentious.44 First, any one of the disputants may ask either an individual
or body to exercise good offices with a view toward conciliation.45 In a
dispute between a developed state and a developing state, the developing
state may request the GATT Director-General's good offices.46 Second, in
38

Id. at para. (6)(iv).
Id.
40
GATT Understanding Annex para. (6)(v).
41
Id. at para. (6)(vii).
42
Id. at para. (6)(viii).
43
Id. at para. (6)(ix).
44
Id. at para. 9.
45
GATT Understanding para. 8.
46
Id.
39
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the case of failed consultation, a disputant may request the Contracting
Parties establish a panel or working party.47 The Director-General, after
agreement with the disputants, proposes the three to five membership of
the panel for approval of the Contracting Parties.48 The members should
be governmental, and not citizens of the disputants countries.49

The

Director-General maintains an informal list comprised of governmental
and non-governmental individuals qualified in trade relations, economic
development, and other GATT matters.50

The disputants may raise

objection to nominees for compelling reasons within seven working
days.51 Within thirty days after decision of the Contracting Parties the
panel must be established.52
Panel members serve neutrally and without instruction from their
national governments, and should represent a diverse background and
wide range of experience.53 Any contracting party showing a substantial
interest in the dispute before the panel has an opportunity to be heard.54
The panel may seek additional advice from an individual or body on an
issue pertinent to the dispute, provided notice is given to the disputants if
either resides in the disputant's nation.55

Disputants have a duty to

promptly respond to panel requests for information, and confidential
information is not publicly released unless authorized by the contracting
party submitting the information.56

47

Id. at para. 10.
Id. at para. 11.
49
Id.
50
Id. at para. 13.
51
GATT Understanding para. 12.
52
Id. at para. 11.
53
Id. at para. 14.
54
Id. at para. 15.
55
Id.
56
Id.
48

Vol. 2 [2003]

RESOLVING TRADE DISPUTES
Daniel H. Erskine

48

Hence, the panel is to assist the Contracting Parties' function under
the guise of GATT Art. XXII:2.57 The panel renders an objective decision
upon the facts, applicability, and conformity of the questioned action with
GATT protocols.58 Such a decision must be in writing if the disputants
fail to reach a mutually satisfactory solution of the conflict, and must be
submitted to the Contracting Parties.59 Similarly, if bilateral settlement of
the conflict occurs, then a written panel report reflecting the solution and
description of the case is necessary.60

Such written reports must be

submitted to the disputants prior to their submission to the Contracting
Parties.61 The resort to panel process should result in prompt production
of a decision within a reasonable time, or in urgent circumstances within
three months after panel constitution.62
The Contracting Parties equally have a duty to promptly consider
panel reports and take action if necessary.63 Special consideration is given
to disputes involving developed and developing countries. In these
instances, the Contracting Parties meet specially and consider the
complained of trade measures' coverage, and their impact on the economy
of the developing country.64 The Parties maintain oversight of compliance
with their recommendation through surveillance.65 At the request of the
complaining contracting party, noncompliance by the defendant party with
the recommendation within a reasonable time may result in the

57

GATT Understanding para. 16.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. Any Contracting Party with an interest in the dispute can enquire and receive
information about the solution as it relates to trade matters. Id. at para. 19.
61
Id. at para. 18.
62
GATT Understanding para. 20.
63
Id. at para. 21.
64
Id.
65
Id. at para. 22.
58
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Contracting Parties making suitable efforts to provide a solution to the
situation.66
The Understanding adopts some of the procedures outlined in the
Havana Charter, but falls short of creating a legalistic framework for
dispute resolution. Essentially, the Understanding leaves much to the
working parties or panels to decide, and provides ratification of these
actions by review of the Contracting Parties. The Understanding
represents the first codification of procedural dispute settlement within the
GATT. The following discussed documents make improvements to the
1979 Understanding.
D. 1982 Ministerial Declaration
Emphasizing the use of diplomatic means to resolve conflict
among the Contracting Parties, the 1982 Ministerial Declaration permits
disputants to request the good offices of the Director-General or group of
individuals nominated by the Director upon the failure of consultation.67
The expeditious process is confidential, positions taken are nonbinding in
further action, and both parties retain the right to refer the matter to the
Contracting Parties.68
Further, the Director-General is responsible to report to the
Council on any case failing to constitute a panel under the time limits for
establishment.69

Additionally, the Director compensates experts from

outside of Geneva serving on the panel, and assists the panel specifically
on historical, legal, and procedural aspects of the panel process.70

66

Id.
Decision on Dispute Settlement, at para. i, 29S/13 (Nov. 29, 1982) [hereinafter 1982
Decision on Dispute Settlement].
68
Id.
69
Id. at para. ii.
70
Id. at paras. iii, iv.
67
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Prompt resolution of conflict requires panels to report an inability to meet
deadlines, and as soon as possible render the report. The panel report
should make a direct finding on whether or not a nullification or
impairment of a GATT benefit occurred, and upon making a finding of
such violation the panel should set out recommendations for resolving the
matter

for

the

Contracting

Parties

consideration.71

After

a

recommendation is made by the Contracting parties to the disputants, the
violating party must report to the Contracting Parties within a reasonable
time of its compliance or noncompliance with the recommendation stating
the reasons for such noncompliance.72

In such an instance of

noncompliance, the Contracting Parties may recommend a compensatory
adjustment with respect to products or authorize the suspension of
concessions or obligations.73

Finally, the decision to recommend a

solution by the Contracting Parties includes the disputants, and consensus
determines whether recommendation is made.74
E. 1984 Decision
The 1982 Decision did not quite solve an essential problem with
the GATT dispute system involving the procedural process of panel work.
In 1984 the Contracting Parties put forth a set of procedures covering the
formation of panels and the conduct of their work.75 The chief problem
encountered by the panel process involved their timely formation and
completion of their work. Thus, improved procedures were adopted. In the
formation of a panel the Contracting Parties indicate to the Director71

Id. at para. v.
Id. at para. viii.
73
1982 Decision on Dispute Settlement para. ix.
74
Id. at para. x.
75
See Decision on Dispute Settlement, L/5718/Rev.1 (Nov. 20, 1984) [hereinafter 1984
Decision on Dispute Settlement] available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/1984decision.pdf.
72
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General the name of individuals not associated with national
administrations endowed with a high degree of competence in
international trade and GATT principles, that they believe are qualified to
serve as panelists.76 These individuals form a roster agreed upon by the
Contracting Parties.
The Director-General retains its authority to nominate panel
members, but may also nominate individuals from the roster, as well as
governmental individuals.77

Parties may still object to panelists for

compelling reasons. In the event of disagreement over panel composition
causing delay of panel establishment within thirty days, the DirectorGeneral, with the consent of the parties and in consultation with the
Chairman of the Council, completes the panel's constitution by appointing
panelists from the roster of non-governmental individuals to resolve the
deadlock.78
Panels, once established, retain the ability to set their own working
procedures.79 Though, panels should provide disputants with a proposed
calendar addressing the panel's work schedule.80 Written submissions,
requested by the panel, should be received by the panel within the
deadline set by the panel.81
These improvements were initially adopted on a trial basis for one
year, but remained in effect until 1989. The reform of the panel procedure
might have caused an increase in panel utilization. From 1985 to the end
of 1989, “governments filed 69 complaints resulting in 27 panel decisions,
as compared with 46 complaints and 20 panel decisions for the first five

76

Id.
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
1984 Decision on Dispute Settlement.
77
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years” of the 1980's.82 The increase in panel use caused another reform of
the dispute procedures in 1989.
F. 1989 Decision
Continuing to desire the prompt and effective resolution of conflict
under GATT, the Contracting Parties improved dispute procedures to an
extent paralleled to their 1979 Understanding.83 These procedures were to
remain in effect on a trail basis until the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
under the supervision of the Contracting Parties throughout the Round in
an aim of continued improvement and negotiation over GATT dispute
resolution procedures.84
Formal disputes resolved by bilateral negotiation and arbitration
awards were required to be notified to the Council so any party might raise
any point regarding such action.85 Other disputes beginning by formal
request for consultation under GATT Articles XXII:1 or XXIII:1 required
the contracting party so requested to reply within ten days after receipt of
the request, and undertake good faith consultations within thirty days of
the request.86 Failure to follow this procedure grants the requesting party
authorization to request constitution of a panel or working party.87

82

Hudec, supra note 8, at 199.
See Extension of the April 1989 Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute
Settlement Rules and Procedures, L/7416 (Feb. 22, 1994). See also Communication from
Switzerland , MTN.GNG/NG13/W/8 (Sept. 18, 1987) (proposing much of the reforms
embodied within 1989 improvements).
84
See Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures,
para. A(1), 36S/61 (Apr. 12, 1989) [hereinafter GATT Improvements]. Hudec, supra note
8, at 417-585, for a history of disputes and their resolutions. See 2 Guide to GATT Law
and Practice Analytical Index, supra note 8, for interpretative history of GATT Articles
involved in dispute settlement.
85
GATT Improvements para. B.
86
Id. at para. C(1) (proposing this time table unless the parties mutually agree to an
alternate procedure).
87
Id.
83
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The failure of consultations to resolve a dispute within sixty days
after the request, results in the requesting party's right to seek
establishment of a panel or working party.88 Additionally, if the parties
jointly believe the consultations failed, then the requesting party may seek
a panel or working party remedy within the sixty day period.89 Request
for consultation must be presented to the Council in writing outlining the
reasons for the request.90
Urgent disputes are subject to an expedited schedule. The parties
must conduct consultations within ten days from the request date.91 If
after thirty days of the request consultations fail to resolve the dispute,
then the requesting party may seek panel or working party resolution.92
Entry into good offices, conciliation, or mediation within sixty
days of a request for consultation shall continue for a sixty day period
before the requesting party seeks constitution of a panel or working
party.93 Yet, if both parties agree within the sixty day period that the
conciliation, mediation, or good offices have failed, then the requesting
party may ask for a panel or working party.94 Resort to the DirectorGeneral's good offices, conciliation, or mediation is also available to the
disputants.95
Another dispute remedy available to the disputants is arbitration.
Disputants with clearly defined issues may, by mutual agreement on

88

Id. at para. C(2).
Id.
90
Id. at para. C(3).
91
GATT Improvements para. C(4) (including as an example of “urgent situation,”
disputes involving perishable goods).
92
Id.
93
Id. at para. D(1) (allocating no time requirements upon completion of purely
diplomatic means of resolving dispute).
94
Id. (explaining that conciliation, mediation, and good offices may continue during
panel and working party deliberations).
95
Id. at para. D(3).
89
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process, contract to settle conflict by binding arbitration.96 Other parties
may join the agreement to arbitrate, provided they agree to be bound by
the award.97
Request for panel or working group process must be in writing,
indicating whether consultations were held, provide a summary of the
facts and legal basis of the dispute, as well as articulate terms of
reference.98

Standard terms of reference govern a dispute, unless

otherwise agreed by the disputants within twenty days of the dispute.99 A
request for a panel or working group is considered at the latest Council
meeting following the request, unless the Council decides otherwise.100 In
deciding to establish a panel the Council may authorize its Chairman to
create the terms of reference for a panel in consultation with the parties,
and circulate the terms to the Council for their comments.[101
Panels are composed of three members, unless the disputants agree
within ten days of the decision to establish a five-member panel.102
Panelists are drawn from representatives of the Contracting Parties and an
improved and expanded non-governmental list of individuals with
knowledge of international trade and GATT principles.103

Upon the

failure to agree on panelists within twenty days of the decision to

96

Id. at para. E(1)-(3) (requiring disputants to notify all Contracting Parties before
beginning proceedings).
97
GATT Improvements para. E(3).
98
Special terms of reference must be accompanied by proposed text. Id. at para. F(a).
99
Id. at para. F(b)(1). The standard terms of reference are: “To examine, in the light of
the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES by
(name of contracting party) in document L/... and to make such findings as will assist the
CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings
provided for in Article XXIII:2.” Id.
100
Id. at para. F(b)(2).
101
Id.
102
GATT Improvements para. F(c)(4).
103
Id. at para. F(c)(1)-(3).
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constitute a panel, either disputant may request the Director-General, in
consultation with the Chairman of the Council, to appoint panelists.104
Multiple complaints, occurring when more then one contracting
party requests a panel, will be dealt with under a single panel whenever
feasible.105 The single panel conducts its proceedings and findings in a
manner not impairing the rights of the several parties.106 Upon the request
of one disputant, the panel renders separate reports on each separate
dispute.107

Every disputant obtains the complaints and written

submissions of the other disputants, and possesses a right of presence at
the oral submissions of other parties to the panel.108
Within one week of a panel's constitution, panelists should fix the
timetable for the process at least to the first substantive meeting.109 The
entire process should not exceed six months in duration, and may be
expedited in cases of urgency to three months.110 If a panel is unable to
complete the process within the appropriate time, then it must
communicate in writing to the Council detailing its reason for delay and an
estimate on the amount of time necessary to complete the panel's work.111

104

Id. at para. F(c)(5) (requiring the Director-General to inform parties of composition of
the panel within ten days of the request).
105
Id. at para. F(d)(1). If separate panels are established to review related complaints,
then the same panelists should sit upon these panels to the greatest extent possible. See id.
at para. F(d)(3).
106
Id. at para. F(d)(2).
107
GATT Improvements para. F(d)(2).
108
Id. Third Contracting Parties, notifying the Council of their substantial interest in the
panel proceeding, have the opportunity for oral and written submissions to the panel, and
access to the written submissions of those disputants agreeing to disclose their
submissions. Id. at para. F(e)(2),(3) (allowing for disputants' access to third party
submissions).
109
Id. at para. F(f)(2).
110
Id. at para. F(f)(5).
111
Id. at para. F(f)(6).
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In any event, the entire panel process can not exceed nine months in
duration, calculated from the date of panel constitution.112
Thirty days after submission to the Council of a panel's report, the
Council takes action upon the report with written objections to the report
given to the Council ten days before the Council's meeting.113 Decision by
the Council on a panel report, unless otherwise agreed, shall not exceed
fifteen months from the date of the establishment of a panel.114 Disputants
attend Council meetings, and consensus decision governs action on the
panel report.115
Compliance with Contracting Parties' rulings or recommendations
occurs through report to the Council by the disputant found in error.116
Also, the Council monitors compliance through status reports by the
contacting party in error until the issue is resolved.117

In disputes

involving developing nations, the Council retains the authority granted in
the 1979 Understanding to provide an appropriate remedy.118
G. Birth of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
As the Contracting Parties came together for the Uruguay Round
of Negotiations, a topic of concern was the GATT dispute settlement
system. Several countries submitted proposals for improvements of the

112

GATT Improvements para. F(f)(6). These provisions, however are alterable by
agreement in disputes involving developing nations. Id. at para. F(f)(7).
113
Id. at para. G(1), (2).
114
Id. at para. G(4).
115
Id. at para. G(3).
116
See id. at para. I(2) (allowing for a reasonable time to comply if immediate
implementation of a Council recommendation is impracticable).
117
GATT Improvements para. I(3) (explaining that the issue remains on Council agenda
six months following ruling, that the issue remains until resolved, and that contracting
party in error submits status report ten days prior to Council meeting).
118
Id. at para. I(4). Additionally, developing nations may request legal advice from the
Secretariat, and the Secretariat makes available a qualified impartial legal expert to any
developing country. See id. at para. H(1).
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The large number of submissions provided the

negotiating group ample fodder for analysis and discussion of the GATT
dispute settlement system.
Most submissions offered differing views of dispute settlement
within the GATT. Among these were a system emphasizing choice by
disputants of “alternative and complementary techniques” permitting
flexible response to conflicts.120 Juxtaposed to the previous submission
were others adopting a rule-oriented method creating legally binding
adjudications through a sequential approach providing speed and
incentives for compliance with Contracting Parties recommendations
through institutional devices.121 Still others saw GATT dispute settlement
as a process protecting Contracting Parties' rights, while promoting
“security and predictability in the multilateral trading system.”122 Another
expressed view emphasized negotiated solution over panel process.123
The United States, supported by Canada, urged improvement in the
dispute settlement process regarding its aims. The United States desired a
system of GATT dispute settlement that adjudged through legal judgment

119

See GATT Secretariat, Meeting of 2 and 3 March 1988 , MTN.GNG/NG13/6 (Mar.
31, 1988). Written submissions were given by “Mexico (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/1), New
Zealand (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/2), the United States (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/3 and 6),
Jamaica (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/5), Japan (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/7, 9 and 21), Switzerland
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/8), the Nordic countries (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/10), Australia
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/11), the European Communities (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/12 and 22),
Canada (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/13), Nicaragua (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/15), Argentina
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/17), Hungary (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/18), Korea
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/19), Peru (MTN.GNG/NG13/W/23), [and] a joint submission by
Argentina, Canada Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico and Uruguay
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/16).” Id.
120
GATT Secretariat, Summary and Comparative Analysis of Proposals for Negotiations
, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/14 (Nov. 3, 1987) [hereinafter GATT Summary and Comparative
Analysis Nov. 3, 1987].
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
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whether a party's action was right or wrong.124 The losing party, then,
ought to comply with the judgment rendered.125 On the other hand, the
European Communities and Japan saw the aim of GATT dispute
settlement to overcome the particular trade problem, not render legal
judgment.126 GATT rules, under this view, became secondary references
subsumed by practical economic, social, or political rationales dictating
nonconformity with GATT rules.127

GATT rules' interpretation lied

within the collective consideration of the Contracting Parties application
of it to the particular situation presented.128
In the area of notification, parties articulated a need for prompt
notice before trade measure implementation, in order to effectuate earlier
consultations to avoid disputes.129 Indeed, one proposal sought refusal of
party requests under GATT Art. XXIII:2 if prior bilateral negotiations
were not held.130 Another party suggested no party should refuse a request
for consultations under GATT Art. XXII.131
Looking to diplomatic measures to resolve conflict, some parties
urged mandatory resort to conciliation or mediation as the initial step in
GATT dispute settlement.132 Others argued for mutually agreed mediation
voluntarily entered into as an alternative option to consultations.133 One
party recommended specific procedures for conciliation, in which the
conciliator adjudged if nullification or impairment of a GATT benefit
124

John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System A History of the Uruguay Round
125 (Kluwer Law International, 1999).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
GATT Secretariat, Summary and Comparative Analysis of Proposals for Negotiations,
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/14/Rev.1 (Feb. 26, 1988) [hereinafter GATT Summary and
Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988].
130
GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Nov. 3, 1987, supra note 120.
131
GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129.
132
GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Nov. 3, 1987, supra note 120.
133
Id.
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occurred, as well as suggested compensation for conduct found in breach
of GATT protocols.134

Others proposed failed consultations should

proceed to good offices by another contracting party, the Chairman of the
Council, or the Director-General.135 Some offered a scheme distinctly
separating mediation from the panel process, while another authorized
panels to “suggest conciliation proposals even if not necessarily based on
provisions of [GATT].”136

Another proposal sanctioned resort to

mediation during panel process, as well as when bilateral consultations
failed.137
Assessing the role of the GATT Council, the United States
addressed the requirement of consensus decision-making seeking greater
restrictions upon veto power. The proposal sought to grant the
complainant an automatic right to have a panel appointed on demand, and
to establish a rule eliminating disputants from Council decisions to adopt
rulings on the panel report or to authorize retaliation.138 The United States
urged that Council decisions be binding upon disputants.139
Hungary proposed the Council divide decision on a panel report
into: (1) decision on acceptance of the legal judgment of the panel in
which all Contracting Parties participated; and (2) decision on the panel's
recommendations for resolution of the dispute, excluding the disputants.140
Another saw the Council meeting four times yearly on a regular basis to
monitor all ongoing dispute proceedings to ensure compliance with panel

134

GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129.
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Croome, supra note 124, at 125 (proposing to exclude disputants from Council
decision referred to as “consensus-minus-two”); GATT B.I.S.D. (36 th Supp.) at 61-67
(1990).
139
Croome, supra note 124, at 125.
140
Id. at 126.
135
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recommendations.141 In such special meetings one proposed an elected or
appointed chairman could preside over the “Dispute Settlement Council,”
and convene consultations or conduct conciliation to resolve a dispute.142
Opponents of this plan pointed to the great amount of disputes involving
developed countries as a disincentive for developing countries to attend
meetings of the Dispute Settlement Council, but believed a deputy
chairman could preside over such a special Council meeting if one were
established.143
One scheme constructed a distinct GATT dispute settlement body,
which reported to the Council and monitored the implementation of
recommendations.144

Another proposal suggested the Council resolve

some evident cases on its own without the panel process.145
Relating to panel procedures, the United States proposal urged that
panelist be chosen mostly from non-governmental individuals to ensure
greater public confidence in panel proceedings.146

Brazil put forth a

proposal granting developing countries greater favorable treatment in
panel cases in an effort to provide such countries with “a higher level of
equity.”147 Other recommendations insisted on standardized procedures
for the panel process.148

Some Contracting Parties asked for panel

authority for an “interim measure of protection” in the case of urgent

141

GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposal for Improvements in the GATT Dispute Settlement
System A Survey and Comparative Analysis , in Foreign Trade in the Present and a New
International Economic Order 355 (Detlve Dicke & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1988).
146
Croome, supra note 124, at 124.
147
Id. at 126.
148
Petersmann, supra note 145, at 364. See GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis
Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129 (discussing how other proposals sought bilaterally agreed
and grey area trade restrictions be subject to GATT dispute settlement procedures).
142
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disputes involving perishable goods.149 One party suggested binding time
tables for each aspect of the panel process with unagreed delays
authorizing a party to retaliate for damage caused by the disputed measure
during the delay upon a finding the measure violated GATT protocols.150
Others desired the Contracting Parties review each request for a panel to
determine its relevance, “the appropriateness of continuing or resuming
bilateral consultations as well as the appropriate method of dispute
settlement before deciding” whether or not to establish a panel.151
Bangladesh proposed adoption of advantageous special dispute procedures
applicable to least-developed countries.152
The European Communities proposed a ban on unilateral action by
any contracting party to remedy a trade dispute, as well as a harmonization
of municipal law with GATT dispute settlement procedures.153

A

differing view granted compensation upon the failure of a disputant to
comply with a recommendation within a reasonable time, and failing to
compensate authorized use of countermeasures upon the Contracting
Parties' approval.154 Other suggestions focused on the Council's ability to
monitor compliance with recommendations by requiring a party in error to
submit written documentation of compliance, including action taken and
proposed.155
Mexico put forth the first comprehensive reform proposal of the
entire dispute settlement process. Its terms included resort to the Director149

Petersmann, supra note 145, at 364.
GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129.
151
Petersmann, supra note 145, at 357. But cf. GATT Summary and Comparative
Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129 (submitting that others believed panels more
capable of accessing the relevance of a complaint, and proposed automatic constitution of
a panel without any decision or deliberation by the Council).
152
Croome, supra note 124, at 227.
153
Id. at 127.
154
GATT Summary and Comparative Analysis Feb. 26, 1988, supra note 129.
155
Petersmann, supra note 145, at 369.
150
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General if consultation failed within thirty days to mediate or arbitrate,
meeting of the Council specifically for the purpose of conducting dispute
settlement procedure activities, and a choice for disputants to be part of
Council decisions on adoption and enforcement of panel reports.156
Canada put forth a similar proposal emphasizing strict deadlines for panel
proceedings, prohibition on disputants blocking consensus adoption of
panel reports, and detailed provisions for a noncompliant party's
subjugation to suspension of benefits.157
Further proposals from the European Communities focused on a
right to appeal panel decisions to a body of experts.158 Switzerland sought
consideration, through domestic legislation, of private citizens' and
corporations' rights in GATT dispute settlement actions.159
In 1990, the European Communities and the United States put
forth proposals advocating the establishment of an entirely new dispute
resolution system for GATT. The proposals were similar in the respect
that each called for an appellate body to review legal conclusions, and
authorized compensation and the right to retaliate against noncompliant
parties.160

The two proposals diverged on the process of deciding

adoption of panel reports. The European Communities desired consensus
rule, while the United States urged either consensus decision to adopt the
report with the losing parties excluded or automatic adoption of a panel
report if disputants failed to appeal or object.161
Many Contracting Parties urged codification of GATT dispute
procedure, and a declaration of commitment to utilize these procedures

156

Croome, supra note 124, at 128.
See id.
158
Id. at 226.
159
Id. at 227.
160
Id.
161
Id.
157
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consistently.162 A “single consolidated text of GATT dispute settlement
procedures would offer an adequate way of expressing a strengthened
commitment to abide by the…system.”163 Thus, in 1990 a draft text on
dispute settlement arose.164
1. 1990 Draft
Reiterating previous GATT practice, the draft required wellqualified panelists chosen from governmental and non-governmental
sources.165 The draft assures a right to panel process, and presents three
options for final drafters to select. The first option permits establishment
of a panel at the earliest meeting of the Council upon which the request for
a panel appears on the agenda.166 A second option provides automatic
establishment of a panel upon receipt by the Director-General of a panel
request.167 The third option modifies the first option by granting the
Council the right to decide upon the establishment of a panel.168
The draft text modified the panel process by establishing an
interim review stage resulting ten days after receipt of final submission
and arguments by disputants.169 In this period the panel submits its report
to the disputants for their written comments, which are received within ten
to fifteen days after acquiring the report.170 The panel report consists only
162

Petersmann, supra note 145, at 384.
Id.
164
Several documents led to the draft text. See generally GATT Meeting Mar. 31, 1988,
supra note 119; GATT Secretariat, Comparison of Existing Texts and Proposals for
Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement System, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/29 (Aug. 8,
1988); GATT Secretariat, Comparison of Existing Texts and Proposals for Improvements
to the GATT Dispute Settlement System, MTN.GNG/NG13/W29/Rev.1 (Sept. 21, 1988).
165
GATT Secretariat, Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/45 (Sept.
21, 1990) [hereinafter GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement].
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
163
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of the panel's description of the dispute, findings, and conclusion,
excluding the panel's recommendations.171 The panel, upon request of the
objecting party, conducts a further meeting addressing the objections
raised in a party's written submission on the panel's report.172

No

objections being raised, the interim panel report becomes the final panel
report, and is circulated among the Contracting Parties.173 If however
objections are made, they shall be articulated in the panel's final report.174
The draft sets out four options concerning consideration of panel
reports. The first and second option in summary state: panel reports are
automatically adopted sixty days after receipt, unless a disputant notifies
the Contracting Parties of a decision to appeal or the Council decides not
to adopt the report.175 The third option dictates a deadline of 45 days after
receipt of the panel report for the Council to discuss it, and requires
disputants to notify the Chairman of the appellate body and the Council
within ten days after the Council's meeting of a decision to appeal.176 The
final option maintains the consensus decisional model.
A standing appellate body, comprised of three to five members and
four alternates or seven members sitting in three member units, hears
appeals of panel reports.177 Members, chosen by the Council, serve for
three year terms, must posses expertise in GATT matters, be unaffiliated
with any government, and represent divergent backgrounds in law and
international trade.178 Appellate consideration and decision occurs within
a maximum of sixty day after notice of appeal.179
171

GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165.
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. (parties may express their view upon panel report).
176
Id. (no notice of appeal results in report's automatic acceptance).
177
GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165.
178
Id.
179
Id.
172
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The procedures for appellate review are left to the appellate body
to draft, and for the Council to approve.180 The proceedings of the body
are confidential, no ex parte communications are permitted, and only
disputants may participate in the proceedings.181 Legal issues raised in the
panel proceeding or in the panel report circumscribe the scope of the
appeal, and the body may modify, reverse, or uphold such legal findings
made by the panel.182 Disputants agree unconditionally in advance of the
body's decision to its binding effect.183
Four options govern adoption of the appellate body's decision.
Options one and two are substantially similar, recommending the decision
as the final disposition of the case unless the Council decides not to accept
the decision.184 The third option announces the decision as final and
unconditionally accepted, subject to the expression of any views by a
contracting party.185 The fourth option adopts the consensus decision
approach.186
The implementation of Contracting Parties' recommendations
occurs by informing the Council of implementation of rulings.187 Such a
party has thirty to ninety days to implement the recommendations if
mutually agreed.188 Lacking agreement, arbitration within sixty to one
hundred and twenty days decides the compliance time.189
Utilization of compensation and retaliation as a tool of
enforcement is sanctioned in the draft agreement to encourage compliance
180

Id.
Id. (disputants maintain sole right to appeal).
182
Id.
183
GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165.
181
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with recommendations and rulings of the Contracting Parties.190 Two
options submit alternate procedures implementing compensation: (1)
making compensation voluntary and subject to negotiations; or (2) at the
expiration of a reasonable time disputants enter into negations to assure a
mutually acceptable compensation package, with failure of these
negotiations resulting in suspension of concessions.191
Similarly, authorization for suspension of concessions or other
obligations may result under four options.192 The first option follows a
scheme of failed negotiations to reach mutually satisfactory compensation,
resulting in the proposal of suspension measures proportional to the
damage suffered to the Council.193 The Council automatically adopts the
proposal with neither the disputants nor a third party allowed to block the
measure.194 The second option sets out procedures applicable to serious
failures to comply with recommendations justifying suspension of
concessions.195 The third option requires notification to the Council of a

190

Id.
Id.
192
The draft text expressly prohibits unilateral action and requires national governments
to ratify through legislation GATT dispute settlement procedures. Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165. The procedures are:
(a) The complaining party suspending concessions or other obligations shall notify the
respondent party and the Council immediately upon implementing any such suspension.
(b) If the respondent notifies the Director-General within ten days of such suspension that
it believes the amount of trade covered by the suspension is not substantially equivalent
to the nullification or impairment, the matter shall immediately be referred [back to the
original panel] [to an arbitrator appointed by the Director-General] to determine a
substantially equivalent amount. [If any member of the original panel is unable to serve,
he or she shall be replaced by a member of the appellate body designated by the DirectorGeneral.]
(c) The parties shall provide written submissions to the [panel] [arbitrator] within ten
days, and within ten days thereafter shall present oral argument to the [panel] [arbitrator].
The [panel] [arbitrator] shall not examine the nature of the concessions or other
obligations to be suspended, but shall determine what amount of trade is substantially
equivalent to the amount of nullification or impairment.
191
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disputant's intention to suspend concessions or obligations, authorizing the
action unless the Council rejects the course of action.196 The fourth option
permits suspension of obligations or concession, temporarily, after a
reasonable time in which the disputant fails to comply with
recommendations.197
Third parties are granted the right to receive parties' submissions
and be present at the first meeting of the panel. Believing a trade measure
already subject to panel process nullifies or impairs a third party's GATT
benefits, a third party may resort to a separate panel process.198 The
original panel hearing the dispute involving the same measure shall
reconstitute to adjudge the third party matter under expedited
procedures.199
Least-developed countries received special dispute settlement
procedures in the draft text. If consultations fail, then the Director-General
may offer good offices to settle the dispute before request for a panel.200
The draft text suggests the creation of the “Group of Five,” as a separate
body for the settlement of disputes involving least-developed nations.201 If
a panel deliberates on a dispute involving a least-developed nation, then

(d) The [panel] [arbitrator] shall complete its work and issue its determination within x
days, unless the parties, in consultation with the panel, agree to a longer period. The
parties must accept the [panel's] [arbitrator's] determination as final.
(e) If the [panel] [arbitrator] determines that the amount of the suspension of concessions
or other obligations is not substantially equivalent to the amount of nullification or
impairment, the suspending party shall immediately adjust the amount of the suspension
to comply with the [panel's] [arbitrator's] determination. Id.
196
Id. (explaining that objection to suspension referred to binding arbitration calculates
the amount of nullification or impairment within three months).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165. (requiring least developed
country to request good offices).
201
Id. The Group consists of the Chairmen of: the Contracting Parties; the Council; the
Sub-Committee on the Trade of Least-Developed Countries; and the Director-General of
the GATT. Id.
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the report of the panel must indicate explicit consideration and execution
of GATT provisions on differential and more-favorable treatment.202
Lastly, the draft text authorizes the employ of arbitration under the
same procedures utilized by panel process.203 The Council discusses the
arbitration, its award, and monitors implementation of the award under the
same procedures applicable to adopted reports.204 The arbitration award
does not bind third parties.205
II. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING
For the purposes of this work description of certain relevant
provisions of the 1994 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) suffices to provide a backdrop for a
discussion of the various governmental proposals to reform the DSU. The
original “Dunkel Draft” comprised twenty one single spaced pages
divided into twenty five sections and one hundred and twenty three
separate paragraphs with a two page annex on procedures.206 The final
Understanding encompasses twenty seven articles and four appendixes.
Hence, the DSU represents the most comprehensive single instrument
dictating procedures and creating institutions in GATT history.
The major features of the DSU are its application to a majority of
World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes, creation of a Dispute
Settlement Body as a special session of the Members (formerly
202

Id.
Id. (allowing for agreements to the contrary).
204
Id. (stating that arbitration expenses be paid by GATT if held at GATT headquarters,
and the award be consistent with GATT and international law).
205
GATT Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, supra note 165.
206
See GATT Director-General, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations MTN.TNC/W/FA (December 20, 1991) (draft
named after Arthur Dunkel then GATT Director-General); Secretariat, URUGUAY
ROUND - TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE - LEGAL DRAFTING GROUP MEETING OF 5 - 7 FEBRUARY 1992, MTN.TNC/LD/2 (February 18, 1992).
203
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Contracting Parties), constitution of a permanent Appellate Body, and
special procedures relating to non-violation complaints in GATT 1994
Art. XXIII:1(b) and 1(c).207 The Dispute Settlement Body oversees the
process of resolving conflict by establishing panels, adopting panel and
Appellate Body reports by consensus with disputants present, and
authorizes suspension of concessions or obligations under the new WTO
charter.208 The Appellate Body consists of seven members sitting in three
member panels to hear appeals from panel decisions.209 Appeal is limited
to legal issues and interpretations made by the panel, and binding upon the
disputant unless the Dispute Settlement Body rejects the decision within
thirty days following promulgation among the Members.210 Regarding
non-violation complaints under GATT 1994 Art. XXIII:1(b), the DSU
procedures apply differently in each case. In the case of a non-violation
complaint, the DSU applies subject to four conditions altering the DSU's
provisions.211 For complaints under GATT 1994 Art. XXIII:1(c) different
procedures apply.212

207

The DSU also sets out special provisions dealing with least-developed Members.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex 2, art. 24, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU Agreement].
208
Id. at art. 2.
209
Id. at art. 17(1).
210
Id. at art. 17(14).
211
The special non-violation conditions are:
(a) the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint
relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement;
(b) where a measure has been found to nullify or impair benefits under, or impede the
attainment of objectives, of the relevant covered agreement without violation thereof,
there is no obligation to withdraw the measure. However, in such cases, the panel or the
Appellate Body shall recommend that the Member concerned make a mutually
satisfactory adjustment;
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of Article 21, the arbitration provided for in
paragraph 3 of Article 21, upon request of either party, may include a determination of
the level of benefits which have been nullified or impaired, and may also suggest ways
and means of reaching a mutually satisfactory adjustment; such suggestions shall not be
binding upon the parties to the dispute;
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Consultation begins the dispute resolution process, with a written
request submitted to the Dispute Settlement Body stating the reasons for
the request, identification of the trade measures in issue, and a statement
of the legal basis for the complaint.213 The time frame for beginning a
consultation is within ten days of receipt of a request, and consultations
extend to sixty days after a request.214

Expedited timeframes govern

urgent cases, and third party Members may join in a consultation upon a
showing of a substantial trade interest in the ongoing consultations.215
Developing Members' particular problems and interests should be
accorded due regard in consultations involving such Members.216
Other diplomatic solutions receive a gloss in the DSU. These
include good offices, conciliation, and mediation.217

Particularly,

disputants may agree to continue these diplomatic solutions during the
panel process, and the Director-General may offer each of these resolution
systems to the disputants ex offico.218
The panel process of the DSU adopted the ideas of the 1990 Draft
Text. Written requests setting out the scope of consultations, the measures

(d) notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 22, compensation may be
part of a mutually satisfactory adjustment as final settlement of the dispute. Id. at art.
26(1)(a)-(d).
212
The dispute settlement rules and procedures contained in the 1989 Decision apply to
consideration for adoption, and surveillance and implementation of recommendations and
rulings. Id. at art. 26(2). Additional procedures applicable solely to an Art. XXIII:1(c)
complaint are:
(a) the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any argument
made with respect to issues covered under this paragraph;
(b) in cases involving matters covered by this paragraph, if a panel finds that cases also
involve dispute settlement matters other than those covered by this paragraph, the panel
shall circulate a report to the DSB addressing any such matters and a separate report on
matters falling under this paragraph. DSU Agreement art. 26(2)(a)-(b).
213
Id. at art. 4(4).
214
Id. at art. 4(3), (7).
215
Id. at art. 4(8), (9), (11).
216
Id. at art. 4(10) (encouraging special consideration for developing countries).
217
See id. at art. 5.
218
DSU Agreement art. 5(5), (6).
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at issue, and the legal basis for the complaint, as well as either standard
terms of reference or proposed special terms of reference begin the panel
process.219 Panel composition remains open to governmental and nongovernmental individuals chosen from a list kept by the Secretariat.220
The Secretariat proposes panelist nominations, which a disputant may
challenge for compelling reasons.221 In a dispute involving a developing
and developed Member at least one panelist must be from a developing
nation.222
A panel functions under a codified set of working procedures,
unless the disputants agree otherwise.223 The panel process commences
and ends within six months of a request for panel process, but may extend
to a maximum of nine months if a panel requests additional time to
prepare its report and conduct its examination.224 Yet, a complaining
party may suspend the panel process for up to twelve months.225
Additionally, the panel releases to the disputants the facts and argument
sections of their report for an interim review process.226 Such a process
allows written and oral arguments to the panel, which are noted and
included in the panel's final report.227 Adoption of the final report by the
Dispute Settlement Body occurs within sixty days after its circulation to

219

Id. at arts. 6(2), 7.
Id. at art. 8(1), (4) (requiring panelists that are still well qualified and independent).
221
Id. at art. 8(6).
222
Id. at art. 8(10); id. at art. 9 (explaining procedure on multiple complaints); DSU
Agreement art. 10 (describing third party access to panel process).
223
Id. at art. 12; DSU Agreement app. 3.
224
DSU Agreement art. 12(8), (9).
225
Id. at art. 12(12).
226
Id. at art. 15(1) (describing process).
227
Id. at art. 15(3).
220
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the Members, unless notice of an appeal or a consensus of the Dispute
Settlement Body decides not to adopt the report.228
The DSU institutionalizes the standing Appellate Body with a
membership of recognized authorities in the fields of law, international
trade, and subjects covered in other WTO agreements appointed by the
Dispute Settlement Body for four year terms with the possibility of
reappoint to only one additional term.229

These individuals are

unaffiliated with any government, representative of the WTO membership,
and recluse themselves from decision of a dispute creating a conflict of
interest.230
The appellate process commences when a disputant notifies the
Dispute Settlement Body of its desire to appeal the panel report. The
Appellate Body hears appeals only from disputants, not third parties, and
should complete its process in sixty days.231 An additional thirty days may
be requested by the Appellate Body to produce its report.232 The Body
addresses each issue raised on appeal, drafting its report anonymously and
outside the presence of the disputants.233 The Body's working procedures
result from consultation with the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement
Body and the WTO Director-General.234 An appeal results in either a
reversal, modification, or sustaining of the legal findings of the panel.235
Appellate Body decisions are adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body

228

Id. at art. 16(4) (altering process from original consensus to adopt GATT practice); see
id. at art. 20 (allocating nine months for Dispute Settlement Body to decide if no appeal
and twelve months if appeal).
229
DSU Agreement art. 17(1), (2), (3) (providing that the Dispute Settlement Body fills
vacancies that arise).
230
Id. at art. 17(3).
231
See id. at art. 17(4), (5).
232
Id. at at 17(5).
233
Id. at art. 17(10), (11), (12).
234
Id. at art. 17(9).
235
DSU Agreement art. 17(13).
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within thirty days of its circulation to the Members, unless a consensus of
the Members revokes the report.236
The

DSU

sets

out

procedures

for

implementing

the

recommendation of the Dispute Settlement Body along with authorization
for compensation and the suspension of concessions.237 Regarding
implementation of recommendations, the Member must inform the
Dispute Settlement Body of its actions taken to implement the
recommendation, and if implementation is impracticable the Member has
a reasonable time to comply.238 A dispute about a Member's compliance
with recommendations results in resort to DSU procedures.239 Surveillance
of compliance by the Dispute Settlement Body occurs through placement
of the issue on the Body's agenda till compliance is achieved.240
Compensation is voluntary, and suspension of concessions disfavored as a
temporary measure. The Dispute Settlement Body assesses the level of
suspension as equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment
endured.241

Objection to the level of suspension imposed is resolved

through arbitration.242
Several issues have arisen under the DSU in application of its
procedures and in the functioning of the system. Some commentators
attack the entire scheme established by the DSU, while others see the DSU
as economically inefficient.243 Other scholars compare the DSU to other

236

Id. at art. 17(14).
See id. arts. 21, 22.
238
Id. at art. 21(3). See id. at art. 21:2(a)-(c) (defining reasonable time period).
239
Id. at art. 21(5).
240
DSU Agreement art. 21(6).
241
Id. at art 22(4).
242
Id. at art. 22(6).
243
See Sean P. Feeney, The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Agreement:
An Inadequate Mechanism for the Resolution of International Trade Disputes , 2 Pepp.
Disp. Resol. L.J. 99 (2002); Warren F. Swartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure
of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization , 31 J. Legal
237
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international dispute resolution systems with differing assessments of the
effectiveness of DSU proceedings.244
A. National Proposals for Change
1 . European Communities
The European Communities (EC) submitted the most far reaching
proposal to reform the DSU.245 The EC seeks textual amendment to the
DSU to authorize withdrawal of requests for consultations and panel
process at any time, or in the case of panel process up until rending of a
final panel report.246 The EU also seeks to create a system of permanent
panelists, who would be appointed to a case by lottery and would hear

Stud. 179 (2002); Charles E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future
of the World Trade Organization , 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 403 (2001).
244
See Jeffery Michael Smith, Three Models of Judicial Institutions in International
Organizations: The European Union, The United States, and The World Trade
Organization, 10 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 115 (2002) (DSU potentially more effective
than other systems); Maria Alejandra Rodriguez Lemmo, Study of Selected International
Dispute Resolution Regimes, With An Analysis of the Decisions of the Court of Justice of
the Andean Community, 19 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 863 (2002) (DSU most utilized
international dispute system). See also Ruth Mackenzie and Philippe Sand, International
Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 Harv. Int'l L.J.
271 (2003) (raising questions of judicial impartiality and independence in international
organizations like DSU).
245
See Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/49 (Feb. 17, 2003), for Australia's proposal
covering substantial amounts of DSU.
246
Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the European Communities and its Member
States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/1
(Mar. 13, 2002) (proposing eighteen month limit on implementation of consultations or
request for panel should be deemed withdrawn) [hereinafter Contribution of the
European Communities ]. See also Dispute Settlement Body, India's Questions to the
European Communities and its Members States on Their Proposal Relating to
Improvement of the DSU, TN/DS/W/5 (May 7, 2002) (submitting detailed questions
concerning each aspect of EC proposal); The European Communities' Replies to India's
Questions, TN/DS/W/7 (May 30, 2002) (submitting statistical data and extensive
commentary on proposal).
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cases in groups of three.247 The panelists would serve for staggered terms,
and would be unaffiliated with any government.248
The Appellate Body would be granted the power to remand a panel
report back to the original panel for additional findings of fact or other
proceedings that the Body might direct.249 Additionally, compliance with
Dispute Settlement Body recommendations would be subject to the DSU's
procedure.250

A disputant disagreeing with its compliance with a

recommendation is permitted to request consultations followed by a panel
and Appellate Body consideration.251 A “compliance panel,” consisting of
the original panelists receives written submissions summarizing the legal
basis of the complaint against the recommendations and specifically
identifies the measures at issue.252 The Dispute Settlement Body retains
the right to refuse, by consensus, establishment of a compliance panel.253
Request for authorizations for suspension of concessions or other
obligations under the WTO would be subject to a request for arbitration to
adjudge the amount of nullification or impairment incurred as a result of
the volatile measure.254
247

The arbitration would be conducted by the

Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 246 (roster includes 20
persons chosen by Director-General for six year terms).
248
Id. (proposing that panelists be appointed for either three, four, five, or six year terms
with an equal number appointed at each interval, and those appointed to three or four year
terms would be eligible for reappointment to a six year term).
249
Id.; Dispute Settlement Body, Jordan's Contributions Towards the Improvement and
Clarification of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/43 (Jan. 28,
2003) (submitting proposal that the Appellate Body be able to remand a case back to the
panel or compliance panel, with directions for the panel, if the panel's report does not
contain sufficient undisputed factual findings).
250
Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 246.
251
Id.
252
Id; Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the European Communities and its
Member States to the Improvement and Clarification of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, TN/DS/W/38 ( Jan. 23, 2003 ).
253
Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 246.
254
Id.; Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the Republic of Korea to the
Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO , TN/DS/W/35 (Jan.
22, 2003) (suggesting fast track option for determination of reasonable time to comply
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original panelists.255

Failure to implement the arbitrator's award may

result in further consultations to reach mutually acceptable trade
compensation that in turn may lead to a request for authorization by the
Dispute Settlement Body to suspend concession and obligations.256 A
Member subject to suspension may request a withdrawal of authorization
on the grounds of removal of the trade measure or dissipation of the
nullification or impairment caused by the measure.257
2. Canada
Canada proposes a new annex to the WTO creating established
procedures to protect business' confidential information produced during
panel or arbitration proceedings.258 Such information would be subject to
an agreement on nondisclosure limited to disputants, panelists, Secretariat
staff, and experts appointed by the panel.259 After conclusion of the
proceeding such information would be destroyed or returned.260

with Dispute Settlement Body recommendation); Dispute Settlement Body, Amendment
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes,
TN/DS/W/32 (Jan. 22, 2003)(Japan); Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on
Improvements and Clarification of the Dispute Settlement Understanding , TN/DS/W/22
(Oct. 28, 2002) (Japan's resubmitted proposal joined by thirteen countries on issue
previously tabled). But see Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvements and
Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/26 (Nov. 26, 2002)
(Ecuador's differing proposal) [hereinafter DSU Improvements and Clarifications Nov.
26, 2002]; Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvement and Clarifications of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding , TN/DS/W/33 (Jan. 23, 2003) (another
Ecuadorian proposal).
255
Contribution of the European Communities, supra note 246.
256
Id. (proposing that request is accepted unless consensus of Dispute Settlement Body
rejects request). If the Member subject to suspension objects to the level of suspension or
breach of procedures, then an arbitration results. Id.
257
Id.
258
Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of Canada to the Improvement of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/41 ( Jan. 24, 2003 ) (offering draft annex
and procedure texts) [hereinafter Contribution of Canada].
259
Id.
260
Id.
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Another proposal focuses on establishment of a new panel
roster.261

Members nominate one person with expertise in GATT,

international trade, and law who is either a Member's national or not.262 A
statement of the individual's qualifications outlining her capacity to serve
as a panelist would be forwarded by the nominating Member to a
committee composed of the Chairmen of the General Council, Dispute
Settlement Body, and the Goods, Services, and Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property councils.263 The committee evaluates the individual's
qualifications to ascertain they meet the standard of expertise necessary to
serve on a panel.264 After the committee completes its evaluation, those
individuals approved by the committee are forwarded to the General
Council for ratification.265 Ratified individuals serve on the roster for five
years with a chance to serve only one additional five year term upon the
General Council's approval.266 Panelists chosen from the roster by the
Secretariat may also be supplemented by propositions by the disputants for
panel service.267

The Director-General, finding insufficient expertise

available on the roster to handle a particular issue, may place upon the
panel a non-roster person.268
Written submissions by disputants and third parties to panel and
Appellate Body proceedings should be made public at the time of
submission by the Secretariat and available through a public registry.269

261

Id. (looking to rewrite DSU Agreement art. 8(4)).
Id. (describing proposal to rewrite DSU Agreement art. 8(4)).
263
Id.
264
Contribution of Canada, supra note 258.
265
Id.
266
Id. (allowing substitution of nominee throughout process and Secretariat to maintain
statements of qualifications for roster persons, which Members access).
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id. (redacting confidential information by disputant for public dissemination). Accord
Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan ,
262
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Coordinately, panel and Appellate Body meetings shall be public and
broadcast to the public.270 Yet, panel deliberations are confidential, and
Appellate Body reports drafted out of the presence of third parties and
disputants.271
3. Mexico
Mexico 's chief problem with the DSU is the length of time a WTO
inconsistent measure remains in force without any sanction.272

The

solution proposed grants authority to the panel to determine the level of
nullification or impairment, which in turn is subject to the Appellate
Body's affirmance, modification, or reversal.273 The Dispute Settlement
Body could then authorize suspension of concessions and benefits upon
adoption of the report.274
Mexico also suggests compensation be based on retroactive
assessment of nullification or impairment, rather then the current
prospective determination.275 Further, Mexico advocates for the use of
preventative measures in extreme instances where the trade measure

Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu to the Doha Mandated Review of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, TN/DS/W/25 ( Nov. 27, 2002 ).
270
Contribution of Canada , supra note 258 (proposing that confidential information
portions of proceeding not be subject to public broadcast).
271
Id.
272
Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations of Improvements and Clarifications of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/23 (Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter DSU
Improvements and Clarifications Nov. 4, 2002]; Dispute Settlement Body, Amendments
to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
Proposed Text By Mexico, TN/DS/W/40 (Jan. 27, 2003).
273
DSU Improvements and Clarifications Nov. 4, 2002 (explaining that determination
could remain confidential until circulation of Appellate Body report with panel
modifying its opinion on level as a result). See Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of
Ecuador to the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO ,
TN/DS/W/9 (July 8, 2002) (discussing similar problem); DSU Improvements and
Clarifications Nov. 26, 2002, supra note 254. (describing Ecuador 's differing proposal).
274
DSU Improvements and Clarifications Nov. 4, 2002, supra note 272.
275
Id.
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causes significant damage to a Member.276 Additionally, the Mexicans
propose the right to suspend concessions be negotiable, permitting a
complaining party to bargain with a third party Member to transfer its
right to suspend in exchange for a trade benefit from the third party
Member.277
4. Chile and the United States
A joint proposal by these two nations calls for submission of
interim reports by the Appellate Body for disputants to strengthen the final
report by their commentary.278 Included in the prior proposal is the right
of disputants to delete, by mutual agreement, those findings in the report
that are unhelpful in resolving the dispute.279

Similarly, the Dispute

Settlement Body could partially adopt reports to implement only those
portions of a report helpful to resolve a dispute.280
A further proposal calls for a right of disputants to, by mutual
agreement, suspend panel or Appellate Body procedures.281

Both

countries emphasize the need for well qualified expert panelists to hear a
dispute, as well as the need for interpretative rules governing WTO
agreements.282 Also, both nations perceive a need to provide additional

276

Id.
Id.
278
Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarification of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO
Dispute Settlement, TN/DS/W/52 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter DSU Flexibility and
Member Control].
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id. See Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of Brazil to the Improvement of the
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/45/Rev.1 (Mar. 4, 2003) (proposing
a fast track option for measure already found inconsistent with WTO obligations by
previous panel or Appellate Body new panel with original members for expedited
procedure).
282
DSU Flexibility and Member Control, supra note 278; Dispute Settlement Body,
Negotiation on Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
277
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guidance to WTO dispute settlement bodies on the nature and task present
for resolution.283
5. Proposals effecting developing and least-developed nations
China urged reformation of the special and differential provisions
applicable to developing members in the DSU.284

Among China 's

proposals are restraints of developed nations against developing nations in
utilizing the DSU to prosecute cases against a developing nation.285 If a
developed Member brings a complaint against a developing Member, and
the challenged measure survives the complaint (not volatile of WTO
provisions), then the legal costs of the developing Member are paid by the
developed Member who initiated the proceedings.286 Finally, China seeks
mandatory “technical assistance and capacity building” from developed
countries so developing Members may effectively utilize the DSU.287
One group of countries suggests conflicts between developed and
developing Members that remain unresolved through failure of the
developed

Member

to

implement

Dispute

Settlement

Body

recommendations should be settled by resort to suspension of concessions
and benefits with respect to “any and all [trade] sectors under any covered

on Improving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement, TN/DS/W/28
(Dec. 23, 2002) (Chile and United States original proposal).
283
DSU Flexibility and Member Control, supra note 278.
284
Dispute Settlement Body, Improving the Special and Differential Provision in the
Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/29 ( Jan. 22, 2003 ) [hereinafter DSU
Special and Differential Provision]. See Dispute Settlement Body, Specific Amendments
to the Dispute Settlement Understanding—Drafting Inputs from China, TN/DS/W/51
(Mar. 5, 2003); Dispute Settlement Body, Specific Amendments to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding—Drafting Inputs from China, TN/DS/W/51/Rev.1 (Mar. 13, 2003).
285
DSU Special and Differential Provision, supra note 284. (limiting the number to two
cases per year brought by a developed country Member against a developing country
Member).
286
Id.
287
Id.
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agreements.288 Another group, called the least-developed group, calls for
specific textual amendments to the DSU to recognize and account for
difficulties faced by least-developed nations.289 Particularly, during the
consultation process, Members should consider and give special attention
to the problems and interests of both developing and least-developed
Members.290 In the panel process, a least-developed nation should be
permitted to request an additional least-developed panelist to serve with
the one appointed to the panel by DSU procedure.291 The group also
supports mandatory compensation for violation of the WTO treaty
provisions, and automatic collective retaliation against developed
Members noncompliant with Dispute Settlement Body recommendations
in disputes involving a least-developed Member and developed
Member.292
III. CONCLUSION
Surveying ideas for an international regime to solve trade disputes,
the problem appears to lie within the desire for enforceable determinations
288

See Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiation on the Dispute Settlement Understanding
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, TN/DS/W/19 ( Oct. 9,
2002 ), for proposal by Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
289
Id. See Dispute Settlement Body, Text for LDC Proposal on Dispute Settlement
Understanding Negotiations, TN/DS/W/37 ( January 22, 2003 ), for Haiti 's
communication. See Dispute Settlement Body, Text for the African Group Proposals on
Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations, TN/DS/W/42 ( Jan. 24, 2003 )
(proposing significant textual amendment to reflect consideration of developing
countries' issues by Kenya). See Dispute Settlement Body, Dispute Settlement
Understanding Proposals: Legal Text, TN/DS/W/47 (Feb. 11, 2003) (proposing textual
changes reflecting mandatory consideration of developing nations' interests by India on
behalf of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Jamaica, and Malaysia).
290
Dispute Settlement Body, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
TN/DS/W/17 ( Oct. 9, 2002 ).
291
Id. (guaranteeing same right to least-developed country as developing country has, but
expanding both by allowing request for an additional panelist representative of their
respective status as developed or least-developed).
292
Id.
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by competent impartial bodies to bind sovereign nations. Treaty
instruments are voluntarily entered into and may be withdrawn from
equally as easily. Heretofore, there has never existed an international
regime resembling a supranational government of which all nations enter
into and remain bound to without the possibility of withdrawal.
Unfortunately, as the various proposals and instruments discussed above
evidence, there exists a need in the realm of international trade for
predictable enforceable judgments.
The need for judicial-type settlement of complaints directly
opposes the essence of a treaty regime, where consent and not judgment
governs actions by international organizations. Perhaps the task at hand is
too great an undertaking for the many nations of the world. In attempting
to garner free trade, sovereignty and national interest get in the way. An
effective dispute resolution system must understand and confront these
key issues.
In formulating such a system, resort to diplomatic tactics proves
inefficient. More sophisticated systems are time-consuming. Disputes just
do not resolve themselves, and so the current system balances the former
considerations by providing procedural guidance and institutional
structure. Yet, a system emphasizing speed and ingenuity could provide a
better result than the current settlement scheme. Such a system could bring
the disputants together for organized negotiation presided over by a
neutral. This neutral would guide the process toward settlement. If
resolution were not achieved quickly, then the neutral turns decisionmaker. He makes a determination of how the dispute should resolve itself.
That determination could then be put before a group of three trade experts
for conformation. If the determination is not confirmed, then the
disputants could resort to a mini-trial process. This process would be an
abbreviated presentation of the facts and legal arguments by both sides.
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Here an institutionalized judiciary could decide the matter. Their decision
would be final. On the other hand, if conformation resulted from the initial
determination, then the determination would govern the dispute.
The process is simple, and grants finality to a dispute. Members
who do not agree with the decision might be able to take their case directly
to the other Members. In such a proceeding the Members representatives
would meet as jury. Presentations and arguments could be made by the
disputants on a limited time table. Decision rests with a two thirds
majority as to whether an infraction of the treaty resulted from the
measure. Remedy of the dispute would come in the form of mandatory
withdrawal of the offending measure. No compensation or suspension of
concessions would result. Noncompliance with such a determination
would result in loss of membership in the organization for a limited
period. Extension of that time or permanent expulsion would be possible if
the offending measure remained in force past the limited period. Here the
penalty for noncompliance is the same for every member.
Introduction of such an approach is unlikely, but its ideas and
simplicity might encourage others to rationalize the dispute settlement
process within the realm of international trade differently. If accountability
is necessary for free trade, then an organization's commitment to that goal
must rest upon a fair dispute settlement technique. Ease of use mitigates
toward greater utilization of the process, and eliminates the need for
complex enforcement mechanisms.

